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Abstract: The Second World War had tremendous impact on Africa. It influenced all stakeholders in the colonial
relationship - the coloniser and the colonised alike. Their attitudes andregards evolved significantly, nothing was
similar to the pre-war world. Some of the war’s most important battles were fought in Africa. The war was
ultimately directed by big powers which had a critical approach to colonialism – the Soviet Union and the USA.
Their military might was much superior to that of the colonial powers like Britain and France. In addition, England
was bombed, and France occupied showing the vulnerability of colonial masters. The participation of African
soldiers in almost all the military campaigns of the Second World War resulted in the colonial metropolis being
obliged to take into consideration the huge human contribution of African societies into the Allied war effort when
planning the post-war future of their empires. The individual war experiences of a number of African soldiers
partly explains the emergence of a new kind of political activities in almost all the colonies of the continent.
Concerning the French situation, the Conference of Brazzaville in 1944 had an impact in North Africa when the
AML (Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom) became a real mass movement in Algeria. The RDA (African
Democratic Assembly) in Sub-Saharan Africa developed as the largest political party in the whole continent. The
British colonial possessions witnessed the same kind of experience with the Pan-African Conference in
Manchester. The decolonisation of these two empires of European origin clearly started at the end of the Second
World War and was, at least partly, its consequence.
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Introduction
Both World Wars – the first and the second – had an important impact in Africa and on Africans,
as well on African societies. In the First World War, there was a huge number of African
combatants in Europe; these figures should also include those who came as forced labour for
the European war industry. The number of African soldiers in the First World War was probably
bigger than in the second one. Algeria alone sent197,000 soldiers and 120,000 workers to
France as participants in the First World War.1 French West and Equatorial Africa provided
about 200,000 Tirailleurs Sénégalais2 for the French Army in World War One, more than
1 This number consists of 175,000 Algerians and 22,000 Europeans of the country. Charles-Robert Ageron, “Le
mouvement Jeune-Algérien de 1900 à 1923,” in Etudes Maghrébines. Mélanges, Virhe. Vain
pääasiakirja.Mélanges Charles-André Julien, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 234, fn. 1; Omar
(Jean-Louis) Carlier, “La première Etoile Nord-Africaine (1926-1929),” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences
Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques 9, 4 (1972): 913-4, Belkacem Recham, Les musulmans algériens dans
l'armée française (1919-1945) (Paris: Éditions  L’Harmattan, 1996), 22-3, fn. 3.
2 Tirailleurs Sénégalais (Senegalese Tirailleurs), these troops were from all French West African and French
Equatorial African colonies. They were called ‘Senegalese’ because Senegal was the oldest French Colony in
Africa, and the Tirailleurs Sénégalais were founded there in 1857.
Published in Suchoples, J., James, S., Törnquist-Plewa, B. (eds.) World War II Re-explored : Some 
New Millennium Studies in the History of the Global Conflict.  Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2019. 
ISBN 978-3-631-77740-4. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/b15269
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135,000 of them combatted in Europe.3 Thus, hundreds of thousands of Africans participated
into the First World War. This resulted from a kind of compulsory conscription which was
applied in the British and French African colonies during the First World War.
African participation in the war had an important impact, not only in Africa and in
Europe in general, but also on all the European colonial empires, and, of course, particularly on
their African colonies. When the almost 300,000 Algerians who had a solid experience of living
in Europe for some years, returned home after the war, this had an important impact in the
country. It was also true in the remote areas from where the soldiers often came. In all three
Maghrebin4 countries, one impact was the political evolution of the colonised populations. They
became more active within colonial structures, and started to defend their own causes. In the
1930s this was visible in the emergence of the political movements which ultimately led these
countries to their independence in the 1950s and 1960s.5
Between the World Wars, the two main European Colonial Empires – the British and
the French – seriously attempted to renew their performance and structures. The British
announced the British Commonwealth of the Nations in the Balfour Declaration in 1926.
France’s Empire re-enforced the organisation of its ‘territories’ so that they clearly formed
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Both of these remained as rather artificial
administrative structures.
In the Second World War, more battles and military operations took place on African
soil. In this sense, the Second World War was much more ‘present’ in African societies.6 From
the more global perspective, some of the most significant military operations of the Second
World War took place in Africa.7
The intention of this article is to shed light on how the regards of the different
stakeholders involved in the colonial relationship changed during the Second World War. In
3 Marc Michel, Les Africains et la Grande Guerre. L’appel à l’Afrique (1914-1918) (Paris: Éditons Karthala,
2014).
4 Maghreb – the land of sunset, from Benghazi to the Atlantic, from the Mediterranean to the southern part of the
Sahara (Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya).
5 Algeria – Parti du Peuple Algérien (Party of Algerian People; PPA), Morocco – Istiqlal (Independence) and
Tunisia – Neo-Destour (Neo-Constitution).
6 So far, I have not found any general estimation on the total number of African soldiers taking part in military
operations in Africa, Asia and in Europe during the Second World War. The only thing I can say is that this
question is important and needs sound and detailed further research. During the Second World War, about 375,000
Africans from British colonies fought alongside with allied forces. “African participants in the Second World
War,” http://www.mgtrust.org/afr2.htm (retrieved on August 4, 2018).
7 This can be seen in the Battles of Bir Hakeim and El Alamein in Eastern Libya and the Egyptian Western Desert
as well as in the Allied landing of November 1942 in North Africa.
3general, the inhabitants of colonies started to see themselves and their roles differently.
Sometimes the superiority of colonial masters was relativized when comparing the military
might of Allied forces with that of the colonial masters. The relations between European
colonial powers themselves also changed. France found it very problematic that the British
Royal Navy directed some of the first military operations in Africa against its naval forces. The
Second World War in Africa had an impact even within the colonial powers. Free France was
clearly opposing Vichy France in West and Equatorial Africa, as well as in the Maghreb and in
the Levant. This was so even if the Frenchmen managed to avoid most of the direct military
confrontation between themselves. Of course, even the Second World War between the Allies
and Axis powers, was, first of all, really a European civil war,8 and thus it weakened the image,
and the prestige of colonial powers in the eyes of the Africans.
The Second World War in general, and particularly its military performances in Africa
itself, also had many political and societal influences on the continent. In the European and
Trans-Atlantic theatres, these had an important impact on the relations between the ‘Allies’
even beyond the Second World War. As well as the attempts to renew European colonial
empires which preceded the outbreak of war, there were also initiatives to completely
reorganize the international system during the last years of the war. The Atlantic Charter9
during the war and the creation of the United Nations (UN) just at the end of the war were
among these attempts; these strongly affected colonial structures and their futures.
Preludes
The end of the First World War and its various Peace Treaties in 1919 meant that the status of
the former German African colonies changed. Togo, Cameroun, German East-Africa and
Namibia acquired new masters: in Togo the master was France which also ruled with England
in Cameroun, while in East Africa, England operated together with Belgium; there was also the
Republic of South-Africa ruling in Namibia.10
8 The Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs and renowned historian, Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, called the First
World War an European Civil War in his study Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco Da Gama
Epoch of Asian History, 1498-1945 (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1953).
9 The Atlantic Charter was the joint declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on 14 August
1941 which defined the peace goals for the post-Second World War period. In the Declaration by United Nations
of January 1942, the allied countries asked for adherence to this charter’s principles. The Atlantic Charter also
inspired many later international agreements, as well as the post-war independence of European colonies.
10 Rwanda and Burundi went to Belgium and Tanganyika to England. Today’s Namibia was at that time called
German South-West Africa. German East-Africa today is formed by Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania (Tanganyika
plus Zansibar).
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In North Africa, the Paris Peace Conference and the Wilsonian program raised hopes
for greater possibilities of the political participation of the inhabitants of the colonies – mostly
these were in vain. In fact, the North African political representatives had attempted to present
a list of political demands to the Wilsonian delegation. In relation to the conditions of the
colonies, only India managed to have its presence acknowledged, and was able to sign the 1919
Peace Treaty in Versailles as an entity, together with the Dominions of British Empire.
In the years between the world wars, there were challenging military conflicts in Africa.
One of the most severe was the Riff War in the first half of the 1920s; this was fought between
the Republic of Riff and Spain (joined later by France) in Northern Morocco.11 The
consequences of this war, where the Riffians were defeated, and in which Spain used chemical
weapons, led to the strengthening of the extreme right in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, even
in Finland.12
In Central and Southern Morocco, Frenchmen were obliged to use military force against
several Berber tribes until the 1930s. These operations were called ‘pacification.’ In Libya,
Mussolini demonstrated an Italian ‘solution’ when he started a kind of Fascist re-conquest in
the 1920s and early 1930s by fighting against Senussi resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar.13
The Italians also had another military adventure in the eastern part of Africa when
Mussolini occupied Ethiopia for almost six years. He invaded the country in 1935,14 and the
Emperor Haile Selassie was obliged to leave the country until its liberation by Allied forces in
1941. Neighbouring Eritrea had been an Italian colony since 1890 and only became independent
in 1953.
Of course, Africa was no more pacific or peaceful than other continents have been in
the longue durée history. The three major military conflicts outlined here show us that the
existence and continuation of European colonialism meant continuous violent confrontations in
11 Vincent Courcelle-Labrousse, Nicolas Marmié, La Guerre du Rif (Maroc 1921-1926) (Paris: Éditons Points,
2009).
12 In Spain this meant the strengthening of the movement led by Gen Francisco Franco, and it had clear impact on
the Civil War in the second half of the 1930s. At the beginning of the Civil War, Franco started his campaign
against the Spanish Republic from Tetouan in Northern Morocco. The Riff War also had the same kind of impact
as far away as Finland where some of the most fanatic right-wing extremists joined it.
13 Enzo Santarelli, Giorgio Rochat, Romain Rainero, Luigi Goglia, Omar Al-Mukhtar e la Riconquista Fascista
della Libia (Milano: Marzorati Editore, 1981).
14 Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was in the heart of the Abyssinian Crisis which had started the previous
year, and which the League of Nations was unable to solve. This weakness of the League of Nations strengthened
the extreme right and Fascism in Europe. The warfare in Ethiopia, where Italy used chemical weapons, lasted with
varying intensity until the return of Haile Selassie with British Commonwealth troops in May 1941.
5Africa. Somehow, these connect the two World Wars together, building a kind of macabre
bridge between them.
The warming-up phase
The Second World War broke out on 1 September 1939 when Germany attacked Poland, two
days later England and France declared war against Germany. It was only on 10 of June 1940
that the war also expanded to the African continent when Italy declared war on the Allied
countries and, in September 1940 attacked Egypt from its colony in Libya.
The Italian 10th army’s attempt to invade Egypt was led by Marshal Rodolfo Graziani,
but the Allied troops, composed mostly of Commonwealth, and later on the Free French
soldiers, managed to stop and defeat the Italians. Generals Archibald P. Wavell and Richard N.
O’Connor commanded the Allied forces. More than 130,000 Italian soldiers were taken as
prisoners of war. In early 1941, Africa became the main operational theatre of the Second World
War when German forces joined the defeated Italians in Libya.
The Second World War in Africa can be divided into several different phases. The first
concerns what is called here ‘the warming-up phase’ where the protagonists built up their main
strategic positions.
After the armistice between France and Germany in June 1940, confrontation between
England and France consisted of a few sporadic, but tragic incidents such as Mers-el-Kebir on
3 July 1940. On that day, the British Royal Navy attacked the French Navy in the military port
of Mers-El-Kebir adjacent to the city of Oran in Algeria. The attack killed almost 1,300 French
marines, there were also material losses such as the sinking of one battleship and damage to
five others.
This incident had long-lasting impact on British-French relations, and it made the
combination of French military into the Forces of the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle
more difficult. De Gaulle had not been informed prior to the attack. Still, he understood the
British reasoning that there was a real risk of the French Navy joining the Axis operations
against the Allies or the French Empire.15 After Mers-el-Kebir, the French Navy no longer
15 On 8 July 1940, Gen Charles de Gaulle issued a declaration in which he understood the British action without
accepting it, and naming it as an ‘odieuse’ tragedy. Along with Winston Churchill, there was real panic among the
British military and political leaders, and the attack of Mers-el-Kebir was one of Great Britain’s most tragic
mistakes in the whole war.
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fought the Axis, on the contrary, on several occasions it really attacked the Allies. Only the
small Free France navy participated in any Allied operations.
The controversial attitudes towards the Allies and the Free France in the French African
colonies were strengthened, not only by the attack on Mers-el-Kebir, but also a week later by
the bombing of the battleship Richelieu in the Dakar harbour in Senegal. Both of these incidents
contributed to the Battle of Dakar.
Between 23 and 25 September 1940, the Allies, together with the Forces françaises
libres (Free France Forces; FFL), tried to conquer Dakar, and convince the city’s Vichy France
authorities to change sides. But they failed because Vichy France fought back very strongly.
This battle and the Allies’ failure had two main consequences. The first was that French West
Africa stayed under Vichy command until Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa
on 8 November 1942. The second consequence was that Free France and Gen Charles de Gaulle
found a reduction in their political weight among the Allies, and they were obliged to base their
African activities in French Equatorial Africa.
For the Africans, the two military conflicts in Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar must have been
rather confusing. It was not only the Europeans – Britain and France – that were fighting each
other, but the conflict also now included a serious confrontation between the French themselves.
Two other battles also belong in this phase – the 1940 operations in Gabon, and a year and a
half later in Madagascar.
In the early November 1940 Battle of Gabon, the Free France and Gen Charles de Gaulle
stabilised their position in French Equatorial Africa. This now became the first territory under
Free France administration. It consisted of important territory from the southern part of the
Sahara desert, from Chad to the Congo River. This was extremely important because from
Afrique-Equatoriale française (French Equatorial Africa; AEF), Free France was able to plan
and initiate new military campaigns across the desert towards the Mediterranean and the Middle
East.
Concerning the ambiguous relations between the two France (Free and Vichy) with
Great Britain, it is important to also note the battle of Madagascar in May 1942. Britain was
anxious about the security of the sea route to India, and wanted to guarantee it. Of course, the
safety of the Suez Canal was the key issue in this situation. Thus, Britain invaded Madagascar,
then under Vichy France, without informing the Free France ,and Gen Charles de Gaulle about
7their plans. Britain wanted to avoid the failure at Dakar and to prevent their bad experiences in
Syria16 from being repeated.
Both Free France and Vichy took the battle of Madagascar very seriously, for them both
it was aggression against French territory. This had consequences about how the Allies prepared
for the landing in North Africa; for Gen Charles de Gaulle the impact lasted until the end of
World War Two.
The second phase of World War Two in Africa was different in the sense that its main
issue involved confrontation between the Axis powers and the Allied forces. From French
Equatorial Africa, and especially from Chad, the FFL started their excursions against the Italian
troops near the southern border of Libya. General Philippe Leclerc commanded the 13e Demi-
Brigade de Légion Étrangère (the 13th Half-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion; DBLE), the
famous unit, as well as the Tirailleurs Sénégalais. These two units formed the core of the FFL
in Chad. They were assisted by a few men from the British Long Range Desert Group (LRDG).
Together they began hostile raids, it is razzia against the Italians in the border regions of
Southern Libya. In February 1941, once General Leclerc had control of the oasis of Kufra,
together with his troops, they made the well-known ‘Serment de Koufra’ (‘Oath of Koufra’)
where they promised to fight until their flag was on top of the Strasbourg Cathedral.17
The third, and often almost forgotten, phase of World War Two in Africa consisted of
the East African Campaign. The Allies, especially Britain, wanted to strengthen their position
in Egypt and, particularly, the security of the Suez Canal. That is why, after defeating the
Italians, and destroying their army with the Commonwealth forces in the Western Desert on the
Egyptian-Libyan border, the troops from the British Empire conquered Italian Somaliland. The
aim of the Allied campaign was to remove the Italians from Africa, as well as to liberate
Ethiopia, and restore Emperor Haile Selassie on his throne.
The British Empire forces attacked the Italians from all the countries bordering Ethiopia,
from the Sudan and British Somaliland to the North, from Kenya and Italian Somaliland in the
South. One of the aims was to join the so-called Wingate Gideon Brigade. About half of its men
16 In relation to the Campaign of Syria, Great Britain and FFL had together succeeded in pushing out the Vichy
France forces. The British leaders were thinking that Great Britain could administer Beirut and Damascus together
with Free France when de Gaulle’s delegates simply made it clear this could not happen.
17 ‘Serment de Koufra’ (‘Oath of Kufra’): «Jurez de ne déposer les armes que lorsque nos couleurs, nos belles
couleurs, flotteront sur la cathédrale de Strasbourg» (‘You shall not lay down arms, until the day when our colours,
our beautiful colours, flutter over the Strasbourg Cathedral’). In summer 2018, more than 77 years later, the tone
of the Oath of Kufra reflects surprisingly Franco-centric and colonial attitudes, especially when it is remembered
that in Chad at that time, the FFL was mostly made up of of Africans.
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were regular Ethiopian troops, that is the Ethiopian units remaining loyal to Emperor Haile
Selassie. Addis Ababa was re-conquered in April, and Haile Selassie returned to his capital in
early May 1941. Italian troops continued to resist for six months until they totally collapsed in
the Battle of Gondar in November 1941, and Africa Orientale Italiana (Italian East Africa; AOI)
surrendered. The Allied forces took 300,000 Italian war prisoners.18 Nevertheless, sporadic
Italian guerrilla warfare continued in Ethiopia against the Allies until the Armistice of Cassibile
in September 1943, which ended the hostilities between Italy and the Allies.
The Allied Forces in the East-African Campaign were composed mainly of colonial
troops, the soldiers originated from British and French West-Africa, from almost all the
Southern- and Eastern-African colonies, from Sudan as well as from Yemen and Palestine, and
even from India. There were also troops from FFL and from Force Publique in the Belgian
Congo.
Besides destroying the Italian colonial presence in East-Africa and ensuring navigation
in the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, the East-African Campaign restored the land
connection from Cairo to Cape Town. This was extremely important for the maintenance of the
Allied Forces when they were fighting against the Axis in North Africa, because it allowed their
resupplying from other European colonies in Africa and Asia.
The East-African Campaign has been rather neglected in the history of the Second World
War. In order to understand why this is so, one explanation could be its distance from Europe.
It also remained in the shadow of European events and European fronts, especially those in
Greece and Albania which were invaded by Axis forces. The third explanation might be the
absence of American (USA) involvement in the East-African Campaign.
In a sense, the East African Campaign might be one of the last, if not the final episode of
the colonial wars, where European powers used the African territories and countries, the
African populations and soldiers, just to benefit their own, mostly colonial interests. How the
societies in East Africa have reacted to ‘European colonial warfare’ is not really known, more
research is needed on this issue. Concerning the decolonisation after the Second World War, in
Eastern and Southern Africa, it could perhaps be said that it followed more general trends in
the British and Portuguese Empires in Africa. Excepting Ghana (Gold Coast), which had
already reached independence in 1957, the others achieved this only in the 1960s, however long
18 Hugo Pratt, Gli Scorpioni del deserto (Milano: Libri Edizioni, 1976).
9before the ‘Wind of Change’ as predicted by Harold Macmillan.19 Unfortunately, for the
Portuguese colonies, independence came only in the 1970s after very bitter conflicts.
The North African War Theatre
After the Commonwealth forces prevented the Italian attempt to invade Egypt, and defeated
their army in autumn 1940, the Germans moved into the African continent in order to help the
Italians, and to restore their presence in Libya. Both the Axis powers and the Allies used much
energy to build up their military structures and organisation in the Libyan Benghazi and
Egyptian Western Desert. In fact the Germans created a complete army called the Afrikakorps
under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. All this resulted in a long series of battles
between Italian, but mainly German military forces) and the Allies in Libya and the Egyptian
Western Desert. These battles form the third part of the African Second World War.
With these new forces, the Axis hoped to reach the Suez Canal, but failed largely because
of Allied defence strategies. In the early summer of 1942, the 1st Free France Brigade, having
crossed the desert, resisted and hindered the progression of the Afrikakorps in the battle of Bir
Hakeim.20 This battle was able to delay the German advance long enough for the Allies to
strengthen their positions. The invasion of the Afrikakorps was definitely halted by the two
Battles of El-Alamein in June, and in October-November 1942 where the Allied forces were
commanded by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.
These battles of El-Alamein developed almost as a duel between the German commander,
Erwin Rommel, and the British Field Marshal Montgomery. The Allies won the second battle
of El-Alamein after what was then the largest artillery bombardment in the Second World War.
It meant that the Afrikakorps defeat was so serious that they could hardly reorganize their
military structures. After those battles, the confrontation between Rommel and Allied forces
moved onto Tunisian soil.
From early 1942, Joseph Stalin and Soviet Union had demanded that the Allies open a
second front against Germany in continental Europe. There were many different rumours about
19 The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s speech, ‘The wind of change is blowing through this continent.
Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact’ was made in both Accra and
Cape Town in January and February 1960. In this speech, Harold Macmillan estimated that African decolonization
would take about two centuries, in reality it took only few years.
20 The reputation of FFL commanded by generals Marie-Pierre Kœnig and Philippe Leclerc improved a great deal
because of the battle of Bir Hakeim. Churchill called them ‘Fighting France’, while Hitler said they were the best
soldiers after the Germans.
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the possible options; one of the most persistent concerned Operation Jupiter, an Allied plan to
attack Norway. This was, in reality, a kind of ruse, or a diversion, because ultimately the Allied
strategic decision was the landing in the western part of North Africa, which had been until then
following orders from the Vichy France pro-Axis government.
Operation Torch forms the fourth, and certainly the most important, episode of the North
African front in the Second World War. The Allied forces embarked to Morocco, Oran and
Algiers on 8 November 1942.21
There was very little resistance from local Vichy French authorities. Admiral François
Darlan, who was the commander-in-chief for the whole of French North Africa, made a deal
with General Dwight D. Eisenhower. With this agreement, the whole of French North Africa
joined the Allies and remained under the control of Admiral Darlan. One of the results of this
volte-face was also that French West Africa joined the Allies; this included the military and
naval installation of Dakar. Following the deal with General Eisenhower, Admiral Darlan was
assassinated on Christmas Day of 1942.22 The Axis powers were so upset by the Darlan volte-
face that Italy and Germany almost immediately occupied all the Vichy French territory in
Europe.
One of the reasons why Eisenhower accepted the deal with Darlan, and also retained the
previous Vichy administration’s civil and military servants in Algeria and elsewhere in North
Africa remaining in charge, was that he wanted to continue the military invasion against the
Axis forces in Tunisia so quickly as possible.
At the same time, the Afrikakorps of Field Marshal Rommel were being pushed towards
Tunisia by the Commonwealth troops commanded by Marshal Montgomery, following the
successful Western Desert Campaign in Egypt and Libya. After the Allied landing in Morocco
and Algeria, the German Wehrmacht started to strengthen their land forces in Tunisia. But the
Vichy France forces also changed sides quickly, joining the Allies in Tunisia. Therefore, the
Axis powers soon found themselves squeezed between Eisenhower in the West and
Montgomery in the East; in early May they were already totally surrounded. This resulted in
21 Operation Torch was preceded by the intelligence activities of Agency Africa. It was created in Algiers during
July 1941 by Polish intelligence specialists. This agency was one of the most successful intelligence organizations
in the Second World War.
22 The deal, which Eisenhower made with Adm. Darlan, was greatly criticized because Darlan was seen as rather
pro-Nazi within the Vichy administration. The deal was also criticized by General de Gaulle and the FreeFrance,
which were almost ignored during the landing of 8 November 1942.
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the surrender of the Axis powers in North Africa on 13 May 1943. The war in North Africa was
almost over for a couple of years.
The surrender of the Axis Forces led to the Allied invasion of Sicily in July and August,
and then, the Italian leader Benito Mussolini gave up following a coup d’état at the end of July
1943. Less than a month later, the Allied forces crossed the Strait of Messina to Calabria. At
the same time, the Allied forces invaded Salerno and Taranto directly from Tunisia. The
invasion of continental Italy had started. After the cease-fire, on 3 September, Italy signed the
Armistice of Cassibile which became public on 8 September 1943.23
The success of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, had numerous
consequences. In January 1943, the Allies held a summit in Anfa, a neighbourhood of
Casablanca, where Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill made plans about how to
continue the war effort. Free France played only a secondary role at this meeting.
A year after the disembarkation in North Africa, in November 1943, Gen Charles de
Gaulle became the chairman of Comité français de Libération nationale (the French Committee
of National Liberation; CFLN), which was recognized as the head of the French state by the
Allied countries. Algiers became the ‘capitale provisoire de la France’ (‘the provisional capital
of France’).24
The Allied landing in the Maghreb, Operation Torch, had an important impact in North
Africa, on the Maghrebins, especially the Algerians. Before World War Two, in the latter half
of the 1930s, Algeria had experienced the so-called Blum-Violette-project, an attempt of
France’s Popular Front to improve the conditions of the Algerians. The main Algerian political
movements had tried to support this Blum-Violette-project by their common action known as
the Congrès Musulman Algérien (the Algerian Muslim Congress). Because of opposition from
Algerian European settlers, both of these attempts failed. At the outbreak of the Second World
War, the French Government abolished and banned the Parti du Peuple Algérien (Algerian
People’s Party; PPA), the most radical of Algerian political movements, and the Parti
23 Giuseppe D’Angelo, “Old Conflicts and New Borders: Chronicles from the Zones of the Anglo-American
Landing of 9 September 1943,” in Borders and Conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin, ed. by Giuseppe D’Angelo
Giuseppe & Jorge Martins Ribeiro Jorge (Fisciano: Mediterranean Knowledge, 2016),
http://www.mediterraneanknowledge.org/publications/index.php/bookseries (retrieved on June 20, 2018).
24 Alexandre Sumpf, “Alger, «capitale» de la France Libre,” in Histoire par l’image (published in May 2014),
http://www.histoire-image.org/fr/etudes/alger-capitale-france-libre (retrieved on July 4, 2018).
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Communiste Algerien (Algerian Communist Party; PCA); both were forced to go
underground.25
In general, the main features of the Second World War, especially in Europe, also had
an impact outside Europe, and especially on colonised people. The war meant that the
Europeans, the colonial masters, were fighting each other. One of those masters, France, lost
the war in June 1940, and thus a large part of the French III Republic was occupied by Germany.
Therefore, confrontation between the pro-Axis Vichy France and Free France followed the
armistice with Germany. After the tragedy of Mers-el-Kebir, North Africa, and Algeria,
remained under the control of Vichy France; thus they were on the side of those who had lost
the Bettle of France and of the occupier.
The Allied invasion of North Africa, Operation Torch, on 8 November 1942 changed
the way the Algerians viewed their own conditions. Like the 14 point program of President
Wilson at the end of the First World War, in August 1941, the Allies and their military forces
published the Atlantic Charter, and later, in January 1942, the ‘Declaration by the United
Nations’. Both documents stressed the right to self-determination of peoples, and also the
independence of European colonies after the war. More generally, the Allies had a political
ideology that was more liberal than that of the Axis and Vichy France, this had importance in
the Maghreb. One of the results of the Operation Torch was that the then official France, Vichy
France, the colonial power, was defeated in North Africa.
The importance of the Allies was highlighted by the installation of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower in Algiers where he was in control of all war efforts, including the French
administration in North Africa and Free France. In fact, Operation Torch and the Allies’
performance meant a de facto end to the story of the French III Republic, at least in North
Africa.
In November 1942, the Algerians also realized that the Allied military forces were of
much greater significance, at least materially in terms of the number of troops and amounts of
equipment, than colonial France ever had. The Allied disembarkation emphasized the
ideological importance of Anglo-American cooperation in the whole conduct of the war. The
Algerians also understood how internally weak Free France actually was, this contributed to its
ambiguous image in their eyes.
25 Charles-Robert Ageron, “Le Parti Communiste Algérien de 1939 à 1943,” in Vingtième Siècle, Revue d’Historie
12, 4 (1986): 41-42, as well as Claude Collot, “Le Parti du Peuple Algérien,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences
Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques 8, 1 (1971):137, 168; Jean-Claude Vatin, L’Algérie politique, histoire et
société, 2e édition revue et augmentée (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1983), 213.
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The disembarkation of November 1942 also resulted in increased activity, especially
from Algerian political movements. This was aimed at reassuring the general population that,
with the help of the Allied forces, their political and social conditions would improve as
compensation for their anticipated war efforts. In fact, in early December 1942, Admiral Darlan
had invited the Muslim population in North Africa, as well as in West and Equatorial Africa,
to join the Free French and Allied forces in the war effort against the Axis powers. This was
done without promising anything in compensation. In spite of this, the large scale mobilisation
started in January 1943.26
Algerian political movements reacted to the arrival of the Allies by presenting their
political and socio-economic demands in return for their contribution to the approaching war
efforts. On 20 December 1942, the main Algerian political movements addressed a ‘Message’
to the leaders of the Allies.27 The message paid attention to the fact that the Algerian Muslims
were asked to contribute to war efforts without clear hope of improving their conditions, in the
same way as the European settlers in the country who had the full citizen rights. The ‘Message’
also referred to the Atlantic Charter’s statement of all people’s rights to self-determination as a
leading principle of the Allied war goals. In concrete terms, the ‘Message’ proposed the
organization of a conference for all Algerian Muslim political representatives and Muslim
organizations. This conference was intended to define the Algerian social, economic and
political conditions. This could then motivate the Algerians to participate fully with the Allied
forces in the war. The ‘Message’ faced a rather cold and indifferent reception from French
authorities.28
The indifference of Free France on one hand, and the Algerian enthusiasm following
the Allied disembarkation of 8 November 1942 on the other, provoked Ferhat Abbas29 in early
26 André Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien 1914-1954 (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1962, 2e édition
1979), 162-5.
27 First Message des représentants des musulmans algériens aux authorités (Message of the Algerian Muslim’s
Representatives to the Authorities) was addressed to the Allies, but the French protested saying that their
sovereignty was bypassed. Two days later the Algerians addressed it only to French authorities, Message des
représentants des musulmans algériens aux authorités françaises. See Claude Collot, Jean-Robert Henry, Le
Mouvement National Algérien. Textes 1912-1954 (Paris – Alger: Éditions L’Harmattan et Office des presses
universitaires, 1978), 152-5.
28 Ahmed Mahsas, Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Algérie de la 1ère guerre mondiale à 1954. Essai sur la
formation du mouvement national (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1979), 164.
29 Ferhat Abbas, orginally from Sétif, was an Algerian politician and intellectual who participated in the creation
of the Fédération des Elus Musulmans d’Algérie (Federation of the Elected Muslim Representatives of Algeria;
FEMA) in 1927. Because the PPA and the PCA, Algerian Communist Party, had gone underground, and the
religious Ulamaa movement had reduced its activities at the beginning of the World War Two, Ferhat Abbas was
 14
February 1943 to edit a document putting together the Algerian requirements for reforms known
by the name Manifeste du Peuple Algérien. L’Algérie devant le conflit mondial (Manifesto of
Algerian People: Algeria in Front of the World Conflict).30 At the end of March 1943, Ferhat
Abbas and several other Algerian political leaders presented the Manifesto publicly. Even if
Ferhat Abbas was the main author of the Manifesto, almost all the Algerian political leaders
had participated in its elaboration. The text of this document regrouped the main points of the
Algerian political movement programs since the 1930s. It was addressed to Marcel Peyrouton,
General Governor of Algeria, and the following day, to the leaders of the Allied Forces in
Algiers.31
The essential requirement of the Manifesto was the right of self-determination for the
Algerians. This could be made possible by the creation of a proper constitution for the country.
The Manifesto also condemned the colonial regime more generally. In fact, the Wilsonian
principles from the First World War were clearly visible in the Manifesto, as well as those
coming more recently from the Atlantic Charter.32
Even if the Free France authority, General Governor Peyrouton, received the
‘Manifesto’ positively, their response was very slow. This provoked those behind the Manifesto
to elaborate a new document called, The Additive to the Manifesto33 in May 1943.
This Additive was more precise and fine-tuned in relation to the original Manifesto in
terms of the political future of Algeria, and socio-economic reforms for its population.
Immediate autonomy would allow the possibility of Algeria’s full participation in the Allied
War effort.
If the Additive was more moderate than the Manifesto in its proposition of procedures,
its forecasts and wishes for post-World War Two Algeria were surprisingly radical. The aim
the most visible of the Algerian political leaders. This pushed him to be active in the new situation after the arrival
of the Allies.
30 “Manifeste du Peuple Algérien. L’Algérie devant le conflit mondial,” in Collot & Henry Le Mouvement National
Algérien, 155-65.
31 Charles-Robert Ageron, “Ferhat Abbas et l’évolution politique de l’Algérie musulmane pendant la 2e guerre
mondiale,” Revue d’Histoire Maghrébine 4 (1975): 125-44.
32 Slimane Chikh, L’Algérie en armes ou le temps des certitudes (Paris: Economica, 1981), 43 and Mohammed
Harbi, Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale: La scission du PPA-MTLD. Contribution à l'histoire du
populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie (Paris: Éditions Christian Bourgeois, 1975), 16.
33 “Document remis au général Catroux le 11 juin 1943 par MM. Ferhat Abbas et le docteur Tamzali. Projet de
réformes faisant suite au Manifeste du Peuple algérien musulman du 10 février 1943 présenté par les Délégations
financières arabes et kabyles le 26 mai 1943,”  (This document is generally known by the name Additive to the
Manifesto (Additif au Manifeste) in Collot & Henry Le Mouvement National Algérien, 165-70.
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was a more or less an independent Algerian state, which would be federated with France. It also
took up the possibility of creating a federation with Morocco and Tunisia.
Before the war, the Algerian political movements wanted to improve the conditions of
the Algerians as French citizens. Now, they wanted to finish with the colonial regime and asked
for improvements for Algeria as a country.34 In spring 1943, the Allies required more and more
war effort from the French authorities. In this situation, the Algerians presented their far-
reaching propositions in the belief that France could more easily accept them at that point than
after the war.35
The response of France to the Additive to the Manifesto was once again very slow, and
much more modest than the Algerians had hoped. Algerian political movements got closer to
each other in their attempts to advance the principles of the Manifesto and its Additive.
In autumn 1943, France started to formulate a post-war approach to colonial questions
in general, and to North Africa in particular. This could be clearly seen in the discourse of
General de Gaulle in Constantine in December 1943 concerning reforms to the conditions of
the Algerians. In the Conference of Brazzaville at the end of January 1944, Charles de Gaulle
drafted the institutions which were to more generally organize relations between France and its
colonies after World War Two. In fact, the founding principles of the Union Française36 were
defined in Brazzaville.37
Concerning the French West and Equatorial Africa especially, the Brazzaville
Conference was a sign of how the Second World War had changed the geopolitical
understanding of the whole African continent. Thus, the Brazzaville Conference was the de
facto beginning of decolonisation, and it impacted all over the European colonial empires.
In Algeria, when facing the French authorities’ slow and modest attitudes, firstly to their
political, but also to their socio-economic requirements, the Algerian political movements
started to support any activities which aimed to promote the principles of the Algerian
34 Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, tome II, De l’insurrection de 1871 au
déclenchement de la guerre de libération (1954) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), 560.
35 Mahsas, Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Algérie, 168 and Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien,
135.
36 Union Française (the French Union) organized the relations between the metropolis (France) and the colonies
between 1946 and 1958.
37 Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 137 and 138. Edward Mortimer, France and the Africains
1944-1960 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1969), 49-52. For details of the background of the discourse of
Constantine and the Conference of Brazzaville as well as the views of Charles de Gaulle on Algeria, see Jean
Lacouture, De Gaulle, Le rebelle, tome 1 (Paris: Seuil, 1984), 752-4. When asked about the possibilities that the
Algerian departments would develop towards more autonomy, de Gaulle exclaimed: ‘Autonomie? Voyons, c’est
par l’indépendance que tout cela finira!’ (‘Autonomy? Come on, all this will end up in independence’).
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Manifesto and its Additive. In this situation of hectic political ambiance in Algeria, on 7 March
1944, Charles de Gaulle introduced an Ordonnance du 7.3.1944. This was the largest political
reform ever accepted by France in favour of the Algerians since the beginning of the colonial
regime in 1830.38 However, for the Algerian political movements it was too little, too late; they
argued that the spirit of the Ordonnance was against the essence of the Manifesto and its
Additive, it was based on assimilation rather than autonomy.39
In order to strengthen the position of the Algerian political movements, Ferhat Abbas
founded, merely a week after de Gaulle’s degree, the 14 March 1944 movement which aimed
to unify all the Algerian political forces. It was called Les Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté
(Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom; AML).40
In the process of establishing the constitution of the AML, Ferhat Abbas and the
Fédération des Elus Musulmans d’Algérie (Federation of the Elected Muslim Representatives
of Algeria; FEMA) once again had the initiative. Nevertheless, they negotiated very closely
with two other political movements, and very quickly, the AML became a real mass
movement.41 In six months, about half a million Algerians had joined the AML, and as its
38 “Ordonnance du 7.3.1944,” in  Mahfoud Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien. Question nationale et
politique algérienne 1919-1951, tome 2 (Alger: SNED, Société Nationale d’Edition et de Diffusion, 1980), 953-5
and Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 138.
39 Collot & Henry, Le Mouvement National Algérien. Textes 1912-1954, 185; Mohammed Harbi, Le F.L.N.,
Mirage et Réalité. Des origines à la prise du pouvoir (1945-1962) (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1980), 20-5 and
Charles-André Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche: nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté française,
troisième édition revue et mis à jour (Paris: René Julliard, 1972), 257 and 258.
40 Especially Youcef Beghoul, “Le Manifeste du Peuple Algérien ou la libération nationale par la voie populaire:
l’appel au pays réel,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques 9, 4 (1974):
215; Claude Collot, “Le Parti du Peuple Algérien,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques
et Politiques,” 8, 1 (1971): 180 and Collot & Henry, Le Mouvement National Algérien. Textes 1912-1954, 185.
41 Collot & Henry, Le Mouvement National Algérien, 185; Harbi, Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale,
18 and 19; Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 259; Mahsas, Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Algérie, 175 and
Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 139. The AML appeared for the third time in the 20th century
when the Algerians tried to advance their political unity. The first time, after the First World War, was centred
around Emir Khaled, grandson of Emir Abdelkader who fought the French invasion in the 1830s and 1840s, when
the Algerians wanted to combine their efforts. The second time was during the French Popular Front when Algerian
political movements tried to defend the Blum-Violette-project by the Muslim Congress. For the third attempt, the
AML united three major movements – the FEMA (Elected Muslim Representatives), the PPA (the radical
movement seeking independence and banned since September 1939), and the religious Ulamaa movement which
defended the Arabo-islamic identity of Algeria; only the PCA, Algerian Communist Party remained outside the
AML. In the two first attempts, the Algerians had defended political reforms initiated by France, in the case of the
AML they were opposing the French initiative, the Ordonnance 7.3.1944 and asked more than France was willing
to support. This was the main and most important difference when compared with the period before World War
Two. See Jean-Claude Vatin, L’Algérie politique, histoire et société, 293 and 294. Vatin highlights that the unity
within the AML was the result of its opposition to the French initiative.
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members, developed a national civic duty and pride.42 The most important impact of the AML
was that it made the Algerian public more politicized and radicalized, it was the political
educator of the Algerian masses.43
In the beginning during the spring of 1944, the program of the AML was a compromise
of the different movements it comprised, and as such, more moderate than the Algerian
Manifesto. In autumn 1944, especially after it had been unable to advance its goals, the
programme of the AML started to become more radical. At the same time, the PPA became
more important among basic members of the AML,44 this also contributed to the radicalisation
of the AML.
The general political, as well as the social and economic atmosphere in Algeria, was
rather hectic, somehow over-heated in autumn 1944 and spring 1945. In the summer of 1944,
the main Allied attention had moved from North Africa to Europe, and the leading organs of
the Free France were transferred to Paris, as such the problems of Algeria were left behind. The
Allies had launched a second invasion from the Mediterranean to Southern France, the landing
at Provence on 15 August 1944. The forces which landed in Provence were composed of troops
from the Anglo-American and French armies. Those in the French Liberation Army came from
the FFL, and the French African Army. Because an important part of the French forces were
troops of African origin, this landing operation increased political tension in North Africa. This
meant that there were also rumours, hopes and expectations of outside intervention against
colonialism.45
42 Virhe. Vain pääasiakirja.Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche. Nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté
française, 259; Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 139 and Benjamin Stora & Zakya Daoud, Ferhart
Abbas: Une utopie algérienne, Destins Croisés, collection dirigée par Bernard Lauzanne, Coll. “L’Aventure
Coloniale de la France” (Paris: Denoël, 1995), 139. Concerning the support of the trade unions to the AML, see
the non-published article of Abderrahim Taleb Bendiab, Le mouvement syndical algérien de 1943 à 1954 et ses
rapports avec les partis politiques, Alger, December 1987, 15 and 17.
43 Beghoul, “Le Manifeste du Peuple Algérien,” 232-6, 251 and 252 and René Gallisot, “Les conceptions de la
Nation Algérienne. Les contradictions idéologiques du mouvement national. Lecture de textes autour du Manifeste
du Peuple Algérien,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques, 15, 4 bis
(1978): 732.
44 As the PPA was banned since 1939, the AML offered it a chance to act openly.
45 Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, 141-3 and Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 669 and
670.
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The European population, the settlers, who had kept a low profile when the Allied
Forces were around, started to raise their heads and oppose the Ordonnance du 7.3.1944, as
well as all the attempts to enlarge the political rights of the Algerian people.46
These kind of different tensions and competition, including a very bad economic
situation, the almost famine situation in several parts of Algerian countryside, led to tragic
violence. This started in early May, and very quickly caused the abolition of the AML on 14
May 1945,47 a week after the end of the Second World War.
Tragic Aftermath
The Second World War in Europe was over on 8 May 1945 when the Allies reached Berlin,
and the Axis surrendered. However, the war atrocities were not over for the North Africans. On
the very day of German surrender, 8 May 1945, in the Algerian towns of Sétif and Guelma,
political demonstrations turned into violent clashes between the protestors, the police and the
European settler’s private militias.
In fact, the first round of demonstrations in Algeria had already taken place on the First
of May when, all over the country, trade unions organized traditional rallies – with official
permission. Some nationalist militants took part in these demonstrations, and confronted the
forces of order in many cities. They provoked clashes causing few casualties, but leaving many
wounded.48
A week later, on 8 May 1945, the victory over the Axis was celebrated and French
authorities organised demonstrations across the country to symbolise Germany’s surrender. As
with the First of May gatherings, numbers of different nationalist symbols were also visible in
the demonstrations. This led to rioting of varying degrees in many Algerian locations. In the
eastern department of Constantine the situation became more dramatic. In Sétif, firing started
to be heard, but who fired first – police or demonstrators – or who were the first victims,
Algerians or Europeans, remains unclear.today. The Algerian demonstrators dispersed all over
the city and killed Europeans they came across. The same scene was repeated in the city of
46 Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 140 and idem, L’Algérie amère, 1914-1994 (Paris: La Maison
des Sciences de l’Homme, 1995), 172-3. The European settlers had threatened to provoke riots which would force
the government to give up the Ordonnance du 7.3.1944 and its reforms.
47 Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 263, Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 719 and Nouschi, La
naissance du nationalisme algérien, 142.
48 Redouane Aïnad-Tabet, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie (Alger: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1985), 33-8
and Roger Le Tourneau, Evolution politique de l’Afrique du Nord Musulmane 1920-1961 (Paris: Armand Colin,
1962), 348-9.
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Guelma, but the number of European victims was smaller. From these cities, the violence spread
into the surrounding rural areas where colonial villages and isolated settler farms were attacked
by Algerian armed groups.
The number of European casualties was just over one hundred deaths, and about 150
wounded. In terms of the population of the Constantine district department, about five percent
(5%) participated in the insurrection.49
France responded very forcefully. Their military forces, including both naval and air
forces, participated in the operations. In addition, the colonial administration and private
militias of European settlers started cruel reprisals consisting of punitive expeditions which
destroyed entire villages, and practising summary executions continuing until almost the end
of June 1945. The French historian Charles-André Julien claimed that even some right-wing
European settlers considered the repression ‘cruel, merciless and really inhuman in its lack of
comprehension.’50
Even today the exact number of Algerian victims is unknown, the estimations vary
greatly, from 1,500 according to the contemporary Report of General Paul Tubert, to the figure
of 45,000 presented by the PPA.51 Probably, the estimate of between 15,000 and 20,000 is not
far from the real number of victims.52
As explanations  for the insurrection and the massacre of Sétif and Guelma, this chapter
has already dealt with the international atmosphere and climate during 1944 to 1945.  The items
49 Aïnad-Tabet, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie, 132-4; Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 263.
50 «Cruelle, impitoyable et vraiment inhumaine dans son manque de compréhension». See Julien, L’Afrique du
Nord en marche, 263 and Boucif Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre, 8 mai 1945. Sétif, Guelma, Kherrata,
préfaces de Mehdi Lallaoui et Jean-Charles Jauffret (Paris: Syros, 1995), 227. Boucif Mekhaled suggests that the
violence of repression can be explained by the determination of the European settlers and local administration to
show France and the Algerians that the time for reforms was over and that there was no place for national
movements in Algeria after the Second World War.
51 “Rapport à Monsieur le Ministre Plénipotentiaire Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie de la Commission chargée
de procéder à une enquête administratives sur les événements qui se sont déroulés dans le département de
Constantine, le 8 Mai 1945 et jours suivants,” this report included comments in the text from Tayeb Chentouf and
Abderrahim Taleb-Bendiab, “Un Document inédit sur le 8 mai 1945 dans le Constantinois: Le Rapport du Général
Tubert,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques 11, 4 (1974): 289-316.
See also Nouschi, La naissance du nationalisme algérien, 142, and Pierre René Gazagne, L'émeute du
Constantinois (mai 1945), rapport du 8 octobre 1945 (Alger: Secrétaire général du Gouvernement général de
l’Algérie, 1945).
52 Alistair Horn, A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962 (London: MacMillan, 1977), 27, fn.; Kaddache,
Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 718; Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre, 204-9. In 1946, the representatives
of the Ulamaa movement in the Algerian parliament presented a figure of 80,000-85,000 victims based on the
American sources. Numbers between 15,000 and 20,000 victims is most frequently supported by scientific
research. After the tragedy, more or less until today, this debate has been political. See Jean-Louis Planche, Sétif
1945: histoire d'un massacre annoncé (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2006). He suggests a figure of 20,000-25,000
Algerian victims.
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of these years included the Conference of San Francisco, the creation of both the Organisation
of United Nations and of the Arab League with their favourable attitudes towards all people’s
right to self-determination, as well as with the rumours about the end of colonialism, and the
independence of Algeria. There were many hopes in the collective mind of the Algerians in that
spring.53
On the domestic scene, the mass migration to France (where hundreds of thousands of
Algerians had worked before the Second World War),54 had stopped totally at its outbreak.
With the collapse of crops, the famine and, importantly, the epidemic with an increasing death
toll, the last year of the war, 1944 to 1945, was the most difficult for the Algerians, especially
the rural population.
Of course, the ways in which the demonstrations and the violence developed are
important. There are different stories and theories about their spontaneity, and even more,
whether they were premeditated and even planned. There is important research literature on
this. However, as Charles-André Julien said as early as the 1950s, even if there were plans about
armed insurrection, there is no proof that anybody gave orders to execute those plans, or that
any probable orders were followed.55 Charles-André Julien spoke about ‘planned provocation’
providing three possibilities – Algerian extremists without connection to political movements,
agencies of local colonial administration, or individual representatives of the local police
organisation.56
53 Chentouf & Taleb-Bendiab, “Un Document inédit sur le 8 mai 1945 dans le Constantinois,” 311; Horn, A Savage
War of Peace, 25, Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 260 and Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre, 89-92.
Mekhaled points out that the Algerian political leaders, including Ferhat Abbas, were continuously in contact with
responsible individuals among the Allies, and contributed to rumors about the rapid change of Algeria’s status at
the end of the World War.
54 Between the two world wars about 650,000 Algerians left for France. Most stayed there approximately 18
months, so the permanent number of Algerians varied between 80,000 and 200,000. Charles-Robert Ageron,
Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine, 4e édition, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 73, Carlier, “La
première Etoile Nord-Africaine,” RASJEP, Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques
9, 4 (1972): 913-4. Carlier notes that, in 1924, the Algerians constituted a smaller minority in France than migrants
from other countries. At that time, there were 300,000 Italians and Poles in France. Ibid., 916-7.
55 There have been some hypotheses pretending that the PPA were behind the Forces Arabes de l’Interieur (FAI),
following the model of Forces Français de l’Interieur (FFI), i.e. resistance inside France during the German
occupation. See Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, 586 and 587, Harbi, Le F.L.N., Mirage et Réalité,
28, idem, L’Algérie et Son Destin. Croyants ou Citoyens (Paris: Arcantère, 1992), 67-9, Mahsas, Le Mouvement
révolutionnaire en Algérie, 173-4, as well as Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre, 108-10 and William B.
Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1968), 51.
Mahsas and Mekhaled mention that there were some preparations for the armed struggle by spring 1942, that is,
before the Allied invasion.
56 Aïnad-Tabet, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie, 43-55, Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 263-5. Julien notes the
possibility of provocation either from the PPA or European extremists. Aïnad-Tabet looks at different possibilities
behind the provocation. For him, both the European settlers and the local French administration wanted to stop the
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Equally important are the forms, and especially the motives of colonial repression,
which caused the massacre of so many Algerians. It is said that when the attention of the
international community and the French government was in Europe, where they celebrated the
victory over the Axis, the colonial administration and the European settlers thought that it was
the right moment to show everybody that the time for reforms and political concessions was
over.57
The reforms, those that the Ordonnance du 7.3.1944 wanted to realize, and the
cooperation between the Algerian political movements, were all finished in the tragedy of 1945.
From the 1945 Sétif massacre onwards, French policy in Algeria became much more
systemically repressive, and expanded into many more domains than before World War Two;
this continued until the country’s independence in 1962. For instance, different electoral
processes were undermined by the disqualification of candidates from Algerian political
movements, by their imprisonment, and finally, by the falsification of results. This became so
frequent from the second half of the 1940s that practice was called ‘elections Naegelen.’58
The attitudes and the political behaviour of the European settlers in Algeria also became
much more extreme and repressive than before the 1945 events in Sétif. During the violence
and massacre of May and June 1945 in the regions of Sétif and Guelma, there was evident
cooperation between the colonial public administration, local political representatives and the
European settlers’ private militias. The methods and the extent of this violence and repression,
outside any control and in total illegitimate practice, resulted in their being seen as a subversive
movement within the colonial legacy. The impact of this has been very dramatic for Algeria,
and also her European population.59
political activity of the Algerians, the foreigners and the fascists aimed to weaken France. How the violence really
started is not known even today.
57 European settlers in Algeria had managed to stop the reforms in February 1919, the co-called ‘Jonnart Laws,’
they had managed to stop the ‘Blum-Violette project’ during the time of Popular Front in the second half of the
1930s, and with the 1945 massacre they managed to stop the reforms of the Ordonnance du 7.3.1944. Charles-
Julien emphasized that Sétif 1945 strengthened their belief that they could continue the domination of the Algerians
forever. See Julien, L’Afrique du Nord en marche, 265-6.
58 ‘Elections Naegelen’ meant arranged elections and falsified election results named after General Governor of
Algeria, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen who started this practice. See Zouhir Mebarki, “Les ‘élections Naegelen’, c’est
quoi?”, L’Expression – Le Quotidien (published on December 24, 2011),
http://www.lexpressiondz.com/edito/145034-les-elections-naegelen-c-est-quoi.html (retrieved on July 16, 2018).
59 What happened in Guelma in 1945 is also seen as a foreshadowing of the extreme right terrorist movement of
Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (Secret Army Organization; OAS), during the last years of Algerian
independence war, 1961-1962. The OAS terrorized both the European and Algerian population, firstly in order to
maintain Algérie Française (French Algeria) within the French Republic, and then to apply the scorched-earth
policy obliging the European settlers to leave the country. Jean-Pierrre Peyroulon, Guelma, 1945 – Une subversion
française dans l’Algérie coloniale (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2009).
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For the Algerians, the massacre at Sétif and Guelma in 1945 constituted then, and
remains, a real shock and tragedy. Almost everything in the country’s evolution during the
Second World War, especially after the Allied disembarkation in North Africa, had encouraged
the Algerians to believe in a more radius post-war future. The factors contributing to these
expectations included the attitudes of the Allies, the approaches from the Free French and de
Gaulle, either in the discourse of Constantine, or in the Ordonnance du 7.3.1944. In addition,
the participation of the Algerians in the Italian and French campaigns, and in the final victory
over the Axis in Berlin, were also significant. If the specific influence of the 1945 massacre
was that all stakeholders within the colonial reality became more radicalised, the effect of this
on the Algerians was the most intense.
The violence of May-June 1945 was the first serious armed conflict between the French
and the Algerians since World War One (1916). Further events of that type now also became
possible. The 1945 massacre had at least five different kinds of impacts on Algerians. First,
despite the general amnesty of May 1946, the main political movements remained prohibited.
This obliged the Algerian political movements to create new parties, which were apparently
legal, to replace those which were forbidden, but which continued to exist underground, but in
secret forms. Some of these parties even had special clandestine organisations for preparing
armed action.
The second impact of the 1945 massacre was the reduction of what had existed in the
AML during the final year of the war, that is, the level of cooperation between the Algerian
political movements and parties. Instead of seeking cooperation, each party tried to reconstruct
its profile after the experience of 1945, and in the situation where the 4th Republic and the
French Union were created. This was especially the case in terms of the elite and the leadership
of the political movements. But the basic members of these movements, remained closer to
their fellows in other movements because of what they held in common. Often, this perspective
was reflected in the double or possibly multiple memberships across several Algerian political
parties.
More generally, it can be said that because of the 1945 massacre, all the Algerian
political movements faced an internal crisis, as well as a crisis between them, which involved
their relationships. This was perhaps one reason explaining why they were unable to propose a
change, or any alternative structure in the colonial relationship.
It is also noticeable that possibly the most important consequence of the 1945 massacre
was the traumatisation, and moreover, the radicalisation of a whole generation of Algerians,
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especially its youth. The young could neither understand nor accept that the massacre was the
Free France response and compensation for the Algerian war effort and sacrifice towards the
liberation of France. Almost everybody in Algeria felt, and still feels, affected by the 1945
tragedy.60 A part of the population, particularly young Algerians went underground; in 1945 or
soon after, it was in the maquis that many of them also started to prepare for the actual armed
struggle, and since then, were merely waiting for the right moment.
In the summer of 1945, General Duval, the commander of French troops in the country,
told European settlers in Algeria that ‘With this repression I give you ten years of peace, do
proceed to the reforms, otherwise the violence will start again.’61 The Algerian War of
Independence started nine and half years later, on 1 November 1954.
Accounts
The Second World War changed many things in Africa. Almost all these changes became
visible in the colonial context, in the colonial relationship, between Europe and Africa. These
changes could be seen in the behaviour of the various stakeholders in the colonial relationship.
It was evident in the ways that the political powers in the metropolis were anticipating their
future, and the future of their colonial empires. In addition, the colonisers in the colonies also
started to see their future in different ways. However, the deepest and the most radical changes
took place among the colonised people, within their political movements, and their individual
human attitudes.
Thus, it can be concluded that there were five different main battlefields and campaigns
for the Africans during the Second World War. In 1940, there were campaigns in Western
Africa (mostly in French colonies), then in Eastern Africa around Ethiopia. Later, there were
two major campaigns in North Africa, first against the Italians, and then between Rommel and
60 An idea of how sensitive the memory of the 1945 massacre remains can be seen in recent articles such as Farouk
Zoghbi, “Massacres du 8 Mai 1945: Mémoire et Histoire,” El Moudjahid. Quotidien National d’Information
(published on May 6, 2018), http://www.elmoudjahid.com/fr/actualites/123186 (retrieved on May 8, 2018) and
Madjid Makedhi, “Mohamed El Korso. Historien et président de la fondation du 8 Mai 1945: « J'ai un grand espoir
de voir cette proposition de loi aboutir »,” El Watan.com. Le Quotidien Indépendant (published on Novembre 10,
2008), https://www.dzairnews.com/articles/elwatan-mohamed-el-korso-historien-et-ancien-president-de-la-
fondation-du-8-mai-1945-l-ecriture-de-l-histoire-procede-de-la-liberte-de-pensee (retrieved on June 15, 2018). In
February 2005, Hubert Colin de Verdière, France’s ambassador to Algeria, formally apologized for the massacre,
calling it an ‘inexcusable tragedy,’ in what was described as ‘the most explicit comments by the French state on
the massacre.’ The Algerians have created at least one association and one foundation to maintain the memory of
the 1945 massacre. The debate about 1945 remains open.
61 Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 721; Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre, 229 and 231, fn. 8;
Nouschi, L’Algérie amère, 1914-1994, 176.
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Montgomery in Libyan Benghazi and the Egyptian Western Desert, and secondly, Operation
Torch, the disembarkation of the Allies in Morocco and Algeria in November 1942. For the
Africans, the fifth battlefield and campaigns were those in Europe, in Italy, France and
Germany, and ending in Berlin in spring 1945.
From the point of view of both the coloniser and the colonised, the international settings
had changed dramatically during World War Two. The emergence of new organisations like
the UN or the Arab League was incredibly important. They were forums where the future of
the world could be debated. But even more important was that they presented a world view
which was very critical towards colonial realities, which, as a matter of fact, were no longer
morally acceptable. In a way, if the UN was an attempt to remake an improved version of the
League of Nations, then the colonial empires also needed to change. They were facing
something of an ultimatum – change your profile or vanish. That explains why the main
European colonial empires tried to change and renew their structures.
Between the two World Wars, the British Empire had tried to renew its structures by
formally creating the British Commonwealth of Nations through the Statute of Westminster in
1931. During World War Two it became obvious that it would be impossible to restore the pre-
war colonial status quo at the end of the conflict. After some hesitation, the Commonwealth
was recreated by removing the first word ‘British’, so that from 1949, ‘only’ the
‘Commonwealth of Nations’ exists where member states are ‘free and equal.’62
In the French case, the evolution was a little different. In spite of de Gaulle’s speech in
Brazzaville January-February 1944, there was no mention of the possible independence of
colonies in any public documents. The renewal of France itself was carried out in association
with the former Empire. In 1946, the constitution was elaborated for the IV Republic and the
French Union.
All inhabitants of the metropolis and the colonies became equally French by citizenship.
After a couple of failures and a few changes, the constitution draft was finally accepted by the
Constitutional Assembly on 29 September 1946. Even if the citizens were equal by nationality,
their electoral status varied. Those living in the metropolis, and those few in the colonies who
had full French civil status voted for the first college, and the rest, a large majority of the
population in the French Union, voted for the second college. This Constitution was accepted
by referendum on 13 October 1946, and was applied from 24 December 1946 onwards. The
62 This prevailed until Britain joined the European Union in 1973. It reduced commercial connections with the
dominions and colonies; these no longer received the free entries to British markets as they had previously.
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French Union only integrated some tens of thousands of the colonial elite into national politics.
Otherwise, French Union was not really a success story, ending in 1958 with the IV Republic.63
The Second World War had a huge impact on political movements in African countries.
In many countries, those whose prototypes had already emerged between the world wars, were
able to modernise their structures and performances. As has already been seen in the case of
Algeria, the AML, The Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom, represented a new kind of
political movement based on previous experiences. Its failure resulted in entirely new kinds of
parties facing the post-World War Two challenges. In North Africa, a situation akin to that in
Algeria also developed in Morocco and Tunisia, where Istiqlal and Neo-Destour confronted the
colonial power, and in 1956 had gained the independence of their countries.
In French West and Equatorial Africa where an impressive number of new political
parties emerged, there was also a serious attempt to unify all these new forces in a region-wide
political movement. At the Bamako conference of October 1946, these different parties created
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (African Democratic Assembly or African Democratic
Rally; RDA), as their common organ. In the second half of the 1940s, 16 national (or ‘local’)
parties had already joined the RDA, which then became the largest political party in Africa at
that time. In spite of various crises and difficulties, the RDA managed to maintain cohesion in
preparing the French African colonies for peaceful decolonisation. This was then realised in the
early 1960s when the RDA had already disappeared. In fact, the RDA had a clear regional role
and has been seen as one of the first really Pan-African movements. Its story ended in the
turmoil leading France and French Union from the IV to V Republic in 1958.64
The consequences of the Second World War elsewhere in Africa were approximately
the same as in French West and Equatorial Africa. In relation to British colonies in Africa, and
even more generally the whole British colonial empire, the Pan-African Congress in
Manchester of 15-21 October 1945 was extremely important, and had far-reaching impacts.65
63 In 1956, there was an attempt to refresh the French Union by the ‘Loi-cadre de Gaston Defferre.’ In reality, it
was, first of all, an attempt to respond to the war in Algeria as well as to the recent independence of Morocco and
Tunisia. The new constitution of the V Republic in October 1958 created the French Community (Communauté
Française) to replace the French Union. The French Community was declared ‘caduc’ (‘abolished’) in March
1961. Today, La Francophonie, that is The Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), is continuing
the performances of French Union and the French Community.
64 The RDA partially ended following the 1958 election when Guinea of Segou Touré voted for independence,
voting “No” to France.
65 The Manchester Congress was the 5th Pan-African Congress after the first in London during 1900. Political
leaders as Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana (Gold Coast), Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, as
well as Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, were participatants. These leaders were all the main architects in the processes
leading their countries to independence in the 1950s (Ghana) and 1960s. In May 1963, their influence helped in
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The Manchester Congress participants included, besides those from the African continent, also
those of African origin from the Caribbean and the USA. The main theme was, of course,
decolonisation, but an important part of the debates also dealt with the problems of racism more
generally, and so had an impact on the entire British colonial empire as well as on other
Europeans. Political movements accelerated their activities in all British African colonies, the
most difficult independence processes emerged in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya.
The Belgium and Portuguese colonies in Africa followed the British and French path,
but with different timing. In the Belgian Congo, today Zaire, it was only 1947 when the Zairean
were allowed to participate for the first time in their country’s administration. Nevertheless, the
Congo’s evolution ended in the violent crisis just after independence at the beginning of the
1960s. In what happened to the Portuguese colonial empire, the Second World War had perhaps
less direct impacts than those affecting other European possessions in Africa; the colonies only
gained their independence in the 1970s.
The Second World War was really won by ‘anti-colonial’ super powers – the USA and
the Soviet Union. The colonial masters, first in the colonial metropolis of France, but also in
the United Kingdom, were bombed and occupied; these nations clearly played the secondary
role among the Allies. Besides all this ‘macro-development,’ the massive participation of the
individual people, individual African soldiers, was a ‘primus motor’, and so the principal
propellant for all this evolution. That is why it is so important to pay attention to the number of
Africans participating into the Second World War in different ways, mostly as soldiers, of
course. Africans participated massively in all five main battlefields, including Europe.
Participation in all these battlefields meant that the African emerged as an individual person,
becoming a full actor, a full subject of history.
This participation changed the ways in which the Africans looked upon the international
order, upon colonial regimes, and upon Europe, which was now quarrelsome and vulnerable. It
concerned the colonial masters, which were now seen as weak and equally mortal. In 1945, the
African soldiers felt that they had greatly contributed to the victory over Germany and the Axis,
and that they had participated in the liberation of their colonial masters. Africans, especially
African soldiers, now saw their own individual position differently, as well as their possibilities
of changing their own individual conditions and lives. They also viewed the positions of their
own countries, and their futures differently.
formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an association of independent African states and nationalist
groups.
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In this perspective, the number of Africans, especially soldiers, participating in all these
battlefields is, of course, extremely important. Unfortunately, the state of historical research is
very modest about this issue. In many cases, for several reasons, often technical, these numbers
are unknown. Until Operation Torch, the Allied landing in North Africa on 8 November 1942,
African battlefields consisted of three major sections. In French Equatorial Africa, the FFL
consisted mainly of locally recruited soldiers. Many had no kind of official contracts concerning
their FFL engagement.66 On the northern front, the Libyan-Egyptian border as well as in the
East-African war theatre, the Allied forces mostly consisted of local British Commonwealth
troops, but also those from Asian and Middle-Eastern colonies. Once again, the exact number
of Africans remains unknown.
At the beginning of the FFL military activities, there were about 30,000 African soldiers
from French Equatorial Africa who crossed the Sahara in 1941 towards the battle of Bir
Hakeim. After Operation Torch in 1942, when the French authorities did their best to mobilize
the maximum of the Maghrebins into the Allied war efforts, the number of FFL soldiers rose
significantly. At the point of the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, and the beginning of the
Italian campaign, the French Expeditionary Corps consisted of 100,000-112,000 soldiers, about
6o percent of them were Maghrebins, mostly Moroccans. A year later in August 1944, when
the Allies invaded Southern France by landing in Provence, the size of the French Liberation
Army was about 260,000 soldiers, 10 percent of them came from Charles de Gaulle’s FFL, and
90 percent from North Africa, mainly Algeria,67 More than 30 countries, mostly African,
contributed to the French Liberation Army between November 1942 and May 1945, its number
varied between 260,000 and 270,000 soldiers.
In fact, the North Africans, as well as soldiers from French West and Equatorial Africa,
participated in the Allied war efforts until the conquest of Berlin and the end of the Second
World War. Nevertheless, it was only during the first decade of the third millenary that, France,
for example, officially recognized the efforts of African soldiers in the European war theatre,
and in her liberation.
Compared with the French situation, the number of soldiers from the British African
colonies participating in the Second World War, is more difficult to estimate. One of the main
reasons for this difficulty is that troops from British African colonies fought, as well as in Africa
66 The story of the FFL finished on 1 August 1943 when it joined the French African Army, and continued its
combat as a part of French Liberation Army until the end of the Second World War.
67 Concerning the North Africans, 52 percent were Algerians and 48 percent Europeans living in Algeria.
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and Europe, in Asia, in India, but firstly in Burma (Myanmar), and in the Pacific Islands against
Japanese forces. Altogether, their number is estimated at, with rotations, around one million
service men.68 The British African soldiers came from West Africa, but also from Sudan,
Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as from Yemen and India. In 1945 when the war was over,
there were about 300,000 African soldiers serving with British forces in southern Europe, in
North Africa, in the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Africa itself. It took about two years to
demobilise those men to post-war life in African colonies.
During the Second World War, the Africans also participated in the Axis war efforts.
When the Italians tried to invade Egypt and reach the Suez Canal in 1940, there were about two
and half times more local than Italian soldiers; those locals were recruited mostly from Libya,
with very few from Egypt.
However, it is also said that for the Africans from Italian colonies, the Second World
War had really started in 1935 when Italy invaded Ethiopia. In fact, the Ethiopian War
continued until May 1941 when Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa. Italy had created a
colonial army called Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali (Royal Corps of Colonial Troops; RCTC),
it was composed of combatants from Eritrea, Somalia, and Libya. Later, Italy also used local
and more ‘tribal’ auxiliary armed forces in her war efforts within the East-African campaign. It
is very difficult to decide on the total number of African soldiers fighting for Italy, the Eritreans
alone are estimated to have numbered about 60,000.
The issue of the German Wehrmacht and African soldiers is very complicated, there are
few studies and very little statistical information. Many reasons exist for this, probably two are
more important than others. First, Germany had practically no African colonies at the beginning
of the World War Two. Second, the participation of Africans in Nazi-Germany’s military forces
contradicted the prevailing racial doctrines.
Nevertheless, there were at least three different ways by which Africans were
incorporated in German military forces. First, there were those who were originally from old
German African colonies in Western, Southern or Eastern Africa, and who were living in
Germany before the outbreak of the war.69
68 David Killingray with Martin Plaut, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (Wodbridge:
James Currey, 2010). Also see “African participants in the Second World War,” http://www.mgtrust.org/afr2.htm
(retrieved on August 4, 2018) about 375,000 Africans from British colonies fought with Allied forces during the
Second World War, cf. fn. 6 in this article.
69 The so-called ‘Afro-Germans’ are not taken into the consideration here. They were the children of German
women and those African soldiers who served in the Rhineland occupation troops. In France’s occupation troops
there were about 40,000 African soldiers.
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Secondly came those who were voluntarily either in the Waffen SS, or later in the
Wehrmacht. In relation to the Middle East, but also North Africa, maybe the most famous case
is the Freies Arabien Legion (Free Arabian Legion). Its soldiers came, first of all, from the
Middle East and then Central Asia. However, there were also representatives from all the five
North African countries. In addition, ethnic entities such as Senoussi and Tuaregs were
represented among these volunteers. The same also applies to some specific cases from the
British and French South of Sahara African colonies.
Thirdly, there were an important number of Africans as prisoners of war in German
camps in various theatres of war, as well as in Germany itself. Altogether, the Germans took
some 100,000 French African troops as prisoners, and some of them were trapped into or
pressed to join German military forces. One characteristic of these African soldiers in German
military forces is that there are few numerical estimations of their number.70 Even if their
number remains modest, it is not insignificant. It shows us that every single phenomena in the
Second World War had an ‘African dimension’, which means that Africans had individual
experiences in all the different features of the Second World War.71
In the long run, it was the beginning of the end of the 500 year old European colonial
domination, which became the most important consequence of the Second World War.
Moreover, here the African experience played a major role. Even the Cold War was a kind of a
side issue compared to decolonisation.
The central position of Europe, and its stepchild, the USA, is clearly on the way to
dilution. The emergence and strengthening of the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa) is a strong sign of these new perspectives where Africa will play
an increasing role because of her human and also economic potential.
70 It is difficult to put forward any estimation. My personal guess is a few tens of thousands of soldiers.
71 In this essay to understand the Second World War and the Africans, the soldiers with African origins from USA
and the Caribbeans and included in Allied Forces, are not taken into consideration separately.
